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Abandoned, abused, neglected, surrendered, run-away, truant, and un-
controllably disobedient children in Florida are neatly categorized by
the law as "dependent." 1 Dependency proceedings are diverse and com-
plex attempts by the court to
delicately balance a number of conflicting claims: the need to protect the
health, safety and welfare of the child; the right of the parent to have
custody of and to care for the child; and the state's sometimes conflicting
interest in protecting both the family unit and the best interest of the
child .2
This comment examines whether due process, under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, requires the provision of
court-appointed counsel to protect the interest of indigent parents in all
Florida dependency proceedings.3
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1979) reads in full as follows:
(9) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this
chapter, is found by the court:
(a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or other
custodians.
(b) To have been surrendered to the department or a licensed child-placing
agency for purpose of adoption.
(c) To have persistently run away from his parents or legal guardian.
(d) To be habitually truant from school while being subject to compulsory
school attendance.
(e) To have persistently disobeyed the reasonable and lawful demands of his
parents or other legal custodians and to be beyond their control.
2. Bell, Dependency Law In Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 652 (1979).
3. The conjunctive issue of the source for payment of fees for court-appointed
counsel was treated in detail by the Florida Supreme Court which determined a
formula recognizing both "[t]he common law obligation of the profession to represent
the poor without compensation . . [and the government's] obligation to provide legal
representation when such appointment is required by the constitution " In the
Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980).
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Decisions of the United States courts on the right to counsel are
not in accord. Recently, in a closely divided opinion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc in the case of
Davis v. Page,4 recognized an absolute right to counsel for indigent
parents in all dependency proceedings.5 The Ninth Circuit has, how-
ever, recognized only a qualified right to counsel, adopting a case-by-
case approach.'
At the time the federal court decided Davis, the only Florida Su-
preme Court decision on point had applied the case-by-case approach
under the rationale of the Ninth Circuit.7 Directing the judges of Flor-
ida's Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Dade County, Florida) to follow the
absolute rule, the federal district court had repudiated the reasoning of
both the Ninth Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court.8 Less than six
months later came the Florida Supreme Court's reply. Expressly re-
jecting the federal district court's Davis decision, the Supreme Court of
Florida explicitly instructed the judiciary of the state (with the excep-
tion of the Eleventh Circuit) to utilize the case-by-case approach. 9 A
second major issue was thus raised by the Fifth Circuit's panel opinion:
whether it was an abuse of the federal courts' discretion to hear the
Davis case in the first place, since "it would have been more prudent to
leave the ultimate disposition of this case to the Florida State courts." 10
DAVIS V. PAGE: BACKGROUND
Hilary Davis spent the night of January 30, 1976 in the hospital
with her fourteen-month-old son, Carl Thor Davis, who was suffering
4. No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981) (13-11 decision), a ffg 618 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1980), affg 422 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
5. Other federal district court cases which have recognized an absolute right to
counsel are: Smith v. Edmiston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) and United
States ex rel. Reed v. Tinder, No. 75-0454 (S.D. W. Va. 1975).
6. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
7. Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975).
8. 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
9. 385 So. 2d at 95. It is noted in this opinion that the Dade County judges.had
responded to the Davis district court decision by appointing counsel not only for indi-
gent parents but for the indigent child as well, "whose interests may be adverse to the
desires of his parents and the State . . .in order to protect the interest [sic] of the
child." Id. at 88-89.
10. 618 F.2d at 387 (partially dissenting opinion).
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from a broken arm. Carl's arm had been fractured as a result of a
beating by his father.11 After she turned to the state for assistance, the
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services initiated a
dependency proceeding to obtain custody of the child. The facts sur-
rounding Hilary Davis' initial involvement with the State Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, leading up to the initiation of
formal dependency proceedings, are in dispute.1 2
Custody of the child was granted to the Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services at a "detention hearing"13 held in
the Dade County Circuit Court, Family Division, on February 4,
1976.14 Custody of the child had been awarded to the state on a tempo-
rary basis, pending the "adjudicatory hearing"15 scheduled to take
11. 442 F. Supp. at 260.
12. According to the court records, Mrs. Davis voluntarily sought foster care
placement for her son to assure that he would be cared for while she relocated and
obtained work. Mrs. Davis' attorneys, however, contend that a hospital staff member
initiated contact with the State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by
filing a child abuse report with that agency. Relying on this report, agency representa-
tives decided that the child should be removed from the custody of his parents. Case
Note, Juvenile Dependency Proceedings - Critical Analysis Used In Criminal Proceed-
ings Governs Timing Of Right To Counsel In Child Dependency Proceedings (Davis v.
Page, S.D. Fla. 1977), 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 99 (1980).
It is possible that this factual dispute may have arisen from either the social
worker's misunderstanding the nature of the type of assistance Hilary Davis was re-
questing, or the social worker's unwillingness to accept, without further investigation,
the claim that it was the child's father, rather than Hilary Davis herself, who beat and
injured the infant.
13. Ch. 75-48, § 15, 1975 Fla. Laws 85 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
39.01(15) (1979)) reads in full: "'Detention hearing' means a hearing at which the
court determines whether it is necessary that the child be held in detention care, shelter
care, some other placement outside his own home, or in his own home under court-
imposed restrictions, pending a hearing to adjudicate delinquency or dependency . "
14. 618 F.2d at 375.
15. Ch. 75-48, § 15, 1975 Fla. Laws 85 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
39.01(3) (1979)) reads in full: "'Adjudicatory hearing' means a hearing at which the
court makes its finding of fact and enters an appropriate order dismissing the case,
withholding adjudication, or adjudicating the child to be a delinquent child or a depen-
dent child."
The adjudicatory hearing is a formal court proceeding conducted by the judge
without a jury. The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and the rules of evidence used
in civil cases are applied. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(b) (1975) (current version at FLA.
287 1Right To Appointed Counsel5:1981
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place on March 4, 1976. Thus, Carl Davis was released by the hospital,
not to his mother, but tb the State of Florida.
Mrs. Davis appeared at the February 4, 1976 detention hearing
without an attorney. It is undisputed that she was indigent at that time.
The judge did not offer to appoint an attorney on that date, but he did
advise her to have counsel present at the adjudicatory hearing set for
March 4, 1976. Because of her lack of funds, however, Mrs. Davis was
unable to hire an attorney to represent her at the adjudicatory hearing.
She made some attempts to obtain a lawyer through Legal Services of
Greater Miami, but appeared at the March 4, 1976 hearing without
counsel. At that time, Carl was adjudicated dependent and committed
to the temporary legal custody of the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services.16 Hilary Davis was advised, at the conclu-
sion of the hearing, to contact a lawyer. She was not advised of her
right to appeal from the adjudication of dependency. 7
Two weeks after the expiration of the thirty-day period allowed for
filing an appeal to the Florida District Court of Appeal, Mrs. Davis
obtained the services of Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc.18 On May
11, 1976, she filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Su-
preme Court of Florida, which was denied by Order on May 18, 1976,
without opinion. 19
On June 24, 1976, a petition was filed by Mrs. Davis for Writ of
STAT. § 39.408(1)(b) (1979)).
16. When a child is adjudicated dependent, the court may place him under pro-
tective supervision in his own home, commit him to a licensed child-caring agency,
commit him to the temporary legal custody of the state, or under specified circum-
stances, permanently commit the child to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services or a licensed agency to receive the child for subsequent adoption. OFFICE OF
EVALUATION, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, AN EVALUA-
TION OF FLORIDA'S CHILD WELFARE SERVICES (1979).
When the child is committed to the temporary legal custody of the state, the com-
mitment continues until terminated by the court, which may be done at any time, or
until the child reaches the age of eighteen years. Ch. 75-48, § 16, 1975 Fla. Laws 104
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 39.41(4), (6) (1979)).
17. 442 F. Supp. at 261.
18. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1980). Mrs. Davis' attorney certified therein that he was retained by Hilary
Davis on April 19, 1976.
19. Id.
4
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Habeas Corpus and Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
in addition to class action status in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida.2 ° On December 22, 1976, Mrs. Davis'
motion for class action status was granted by the district court.21 Sub-
sequent to filing her petition and complaint in federal court, Mrs. Davis
filed a petition in the Dade County Circuit Court seeking the return of
custody of her son. Her petition was granted and the court returned
custody to Mrs. Davis,22 subject to continuing supervision of the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the continuing ju-
risdiction of the Dade County Circuit Court.23
The federal district court concluded that there is an absolute right
to counsel for indigent parents in dependency proceedings in Florida.24
Defendants in the federal district court action (the Florida judges of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit) appealed the district court's decision,
and on June 6, 1980, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.25 On March 23, 1981, this decision was affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.26
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY HEARINGS
Due process, as accorded by the fourteenth amendment, is the
basis upon which the Fifth Circuit rested its holding. To determine
whether due process requirements applied, the court looked "not to the
'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake .. .to see if the
interest [was] within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
and property. ' 27 The right to family integrity as a fundamental right is
20. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 3, Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1980).
21. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the class was
defined as "all indigent persons who have been or may be defendants in dependency
and neglect proceedings in the Juvenile and Family Division of Dade County Circuit
Court, without being afforded the right to counsel at state expense and without being
advised of their right of counsel." Id. at 4, citing Record on Appeal at 124-28.
22. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 3-4, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 49, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1980).
24. 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
25. 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. Davis v. Page, No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981).
27. 618 F.2d at 378 (emphasis in the original) (restated in Davis v. Page, No.
289 11 5:1981
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well established28 and was not at issue in the clash between the federal
judiciary and the Florida Supreme Court. Rather, at issue was the
proper method to employ to adequately safeguard that fundamental
right. The Florida Supreme Court, subsequent to the district court's
decision in Davis, reaffirmed its own recognition of a "constitutionally
protected interest in preserving the family unit and [in] raising one's
children."29 However, the court also indicated that "[t]he extent of
procedural due process protections varies with the character of the in-
terest and nature of the proceeding involved."' 0
In examining the nature of the proceedings involved in cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has established an absolute
right to counsel,31 the Florida Supreme Court concluded that this right
applies only in criminal cases and flows principally from the sixth
amendment right to counsel, applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, rather than from the fourteenth amendment due process
guarantee. Right to counsel in dependency proceedings, on the other
hand, is governed by due process considerations, rather than the sixth
amendment.32
According to the Florida Supreme Court, due process considerations
flowing from the fourteenth amendment are adequately safeguarded by
application of the criteria adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Cleaver v.
Wilcox,33 but rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Davis v. Page. The court
78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981)).
28. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
29. 385 So. 2d at 90.
30. Id. at 89, citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (emphasis added).
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel in a capital case);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for serious noncapital
offenses); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel for juveniles in juvenile
delinquency proceedings where the issue is commitment of the juvenile for criminal
conduct); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel for petit of-
fenses whenever imprisonment could be imposed).
32. 385 So. 2d at 89.
33. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
6
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expressly affirmed the use of these criteria on a case-by-case basis in its
landmark decision of Potvin v. Keller."' It recently reaffirmed its posi-
tion in In the Interest of D.B., decided subsequent to the district court's
decision in Davis. The Florida Supreme Court, however, expressed par-
tial agreement with the Davis decision in In the Interest of D.B., indi-
cating that to meet due process considerations counsel is "always re-
quired in proceedings where permanent termination of custody might
result [or] when the proceedings .. .may lead to' criminal abuse
charges." 35 Proper application of the Potvin test will always require
appointment of counsel in these situations, so an absolute rule is not
viewed as necessary.3 6 In other dependency situations, under the
Cleaver analysis, due process requirements may be met by the statu-
tory provision for notice and opportunity to be heard.3 7 Another Florida
case on point prior to In the Interest of D.B. reversed an adjudication
of dependency on the grounds that the indigent parent was not afforded
counsel at the adjudicatory hearing.38 This decision was reached by a
Florida District Court of Appeal, utilizing the Potvin case-by-case
approach.3 9
Examining the nature of dependency proceedings in Florida, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the case-by-case approach is "unwork-
able."40 The court based this holding upon an analysis of a dependency
34. 313 So. 2d at 706 (footnotes omitted). The criteria include:
(i) the potential length of parent-child separation,
(ii) the degree of parental restrictions on visitation,
(iii) the presence or absence of parental consent,
(iv) the presence or absence of disputed facts, and
(v) the complexity of the proceeding in terms of witnesses and documents.
The Cleaver criteria not only comport with constitutional due process require-
ments, they offer a sensible set of guidelines for determining the inherent unfair-
ness of a custody proceeding.
The Fifth Circuit, in its en bane decision rejected these criteria as being, "often
unknowable in advance of the proceeding." No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5058.
35. 385 So.2d at 90-91.
36. Id. at 90.
37. The essence of due process is the requirement that one in jeopardy of serious
loss be given notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it. Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. In the Interest of R.W.H., 375 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
39. Id.
40. 618 F.2d at 383.
291 1
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action as one which is procedurally comparable to a criminal court pro-
ceeding. The court started by noting that the United States Supreme
Court rejected the case-by-case rule of Betts v. Brady 1 in its landmark
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright,42 which established the absolute right
of indigent criminal defendants threatened with imprisonment to ap-
pointed counsel. 43 From Gideon, the Supreme Court found an absolute
right to counsel for indigent juveniles faced with delinquency proceed-
ings in the case of In re Gault.44 The Fifth Circuit, recognizing the
potentially serious consequences to the parent, held that the indigent
parent involved in a dependency proceeding stands in virtually the
same position as the indigent juvenile faced with a delinquency pro-
ceeding. 45 The court concluded that the parent in this situation "needs
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it."'46
Does the parent in a dependency hearing, who is not referred to as
a "defendant," require a defense? "As a practical matter. . . the state
through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services accuses
the parent of abuse or neglect of a child.' However, the language
from Gault may not be as broad as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit.
Gault continues: "[t]he child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.' ",48 This language appears
to emphasize the formal accusations lodged against the juvenile defen-
dant. The Supreme Court in Gault quoted from its decision establish-
ing an absolute right to appointed counsel for an indigent defendant in
a capital case.49 The Gault Court stressed heavily the fact that a juve-
nile in a delinquency hearing, like an adult in a criminal prosecution, is
41. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. 618 F.2d at 384.
44. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
45. 618 F.2d at 381.
46. Id., citing 387 U.S. at 36.
47. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA JU-
VENILE LAW AND PRACTICE 218 (1979-80)(emphasis added). See note I supra, demon-
strating that the parent is not always the accused in a Florida dependency action.
48. 387 U.S. at 36, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
8
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confronted with the "awesome prospect of incarceration." 50
In a partially dissenting opinion, Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth
Circuit pointed out that "[e]very case on which the majority . . . [re-
lied] in support of its holding of an absolute right to counsel for parents
in a child dependency proceeding, is a criminal case involving the sixth
amendment, or at least involving the potential confinement of the per-
son to whom the absolute right is granted." 51 Judge Brown reflects the
position of the Florida Supreme Court that the right to counsel in a
dependency hearing flows, not from the sixth, but from the fourteenth
amendment, and is therefore a right of different constitutional
dimensions.
A criminal defendant's right involves his protection of his own lib-
erty; a parent's right in a dependency proceeding involves maintaining
custody of his child. In the latter case, it is the child's best interest
which is paramount. A dependency proceeding, unlike a delinquency
proceeding, is not against the child. To the contrary, Samuel P. Bell,
majority leader of the Florida House of Representatives, stated,
"[b]roadly defined, the 'delinquent' is a child who has committed an
act in violation of the law; the 'dependent' is the innocent victim of
actions or conditions over which he has little or no control. 52 A depen-
dency hearing is against neither parent nor child, rather, it is for the
child. Bell indicates that the attorney representing a parent in a depen-
dency action must be cautious because "[t]he natural tendency is to
want to represent the adult against an agency or professionals who are
questioning the adult's behavior, rather than recognizing there is a
deep-seated problem with the family or the child." 53
The Fifth Circuit in Davis, however, concentrates on the severe
consequences which may flow to the parent after the adjudication of
dependency is made. In order to regain custody of the child, the parent
must petition the court to return the child through a "disposition hear-
ing."" At this hearing, the parent bears the burden of proof to demon-
50. 387 U.S. at 36.
51. 618 F.2d at 388-89. Judge Brown, joined by ten of his colleagues, reiterated
this position in a strong dissent in the en bane decision.
52. Bell, supra note 2, at 652.
53. Id. at 658.
54. Ch. 75-48, § 22, 1975 Fla. Laws 108 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
39.408(2) (1979)).
293 115:1981
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strate that, because of subsequent developments, restoration of custody
is in the best interest of the child.55 The effect of shifting the burden
can be disproportionate. 6
In a recent evaluation of Florida's child welfare services, the Flor-
ida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services found that the
mean stay in foster care for dependent children is two years and ten
months.57 Cases were documented in which children had been in foster
care for over seventeen years.58 In over thirty-six percent of the cases
examined, children had remained in foster care for more than five
years.59 The effect of an adjudication of dependency can be a commit-
ment of the child to the temporary custody of the state, which contin-
ues until terminated by the court, following a disposition hearing, or
until the child reaches the age of eighteen years.6 0 Since temporary
custody may encompass the entire period prior to a child's reaching
legal adulthood, Davis raises the question of whether a temporary com-
mitment might always carry the potential of permanently terminating
a parental custody. Viewed in this light, temporary commitment pro-
ceedings would always come under the Florida Supreme Court's post-
Davis rule, requiring appointment of counsel to indigent parents when-
ever permanent termination of parental rights is threatened.61
55. 618 F.2d at 380.
56. Evidence inadequate to support a finding of dependency may nevertheless be
"adequate to support [a] . . . refusal to restore custody," even when the parents
demonstrate their fitness, ability, and willingness to properly rear their child. Pendarvis
v. State, 104 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
57. OFFICE OF EVALUATION, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE
SERVICES, AN EVALUATION OF FLORIDA'S CHILD WELFARE SERVICES (1979).
58. Id. at 30-31.
59. Id. at 71-73.
60. See discussion at note 16 supra.
61. 385 So. 2d at 90-91. Thirty-one states now provide an absolute right to
court-appointed counsel for indigent parents in juvenile dependency hearings. They are
as follows: ALA. CODE § 15-63(b) (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-225 (1974);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 237-.5 (West 1971); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-1701(d), 24A-2001(a)
(1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 802-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1606(c), 16-1608
(1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(1) (1975); IND. CODE § 34-1-1-3 (1973);
IOWA CODE § 232.28 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3792 (1980); MD. Crs.
& JUD. PROC. CODE § 3-821 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29 (West
1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43.205.06 (1978);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604A-1 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43 (West 1976);
10
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THE JURISDICTION QUESTION: SHOULD THE ISSUE BE RESOLVED
BY FLORIDA COURTS OR BY FEDERAL COURTS?
Hilary Davis was not advised by the Dade County Circuit Court
of her right to appeal the adjudication of her child's dependency under
Florida law. 2 She did not obtain the services of an attorney until the
expiration date for filing a state appeal had passed.6 3 Her petition for
habeas corpus to the Florida Supreme Court was denied.0' At that
point, she had exhausted her state remedies and consequently, sought
federal habeas corpus relief.
Whether the federal district court abused its discretion in adjudi-
cating Mrs. Davis' claim is an issue raised by Judge John R. Brown of
the Fifth Circuit in his partially dissenting opinion. 5 The Dade County
judges in their supplemental brief for the rehearing en banc, argued
that although no particular petition was before the state court at the
time Mrs. Davis filed her federal action, the jurisdiction of the state
circuit court had been invoked and was continuing.6 Therefore, argu-
ably, she had not exhausted state remedies. In fact, acting upon a peti-
tion subsequently filed by Mrs. Davis, the state circuit court returned
custody of her child to her,6 7 exercising its continuing jurisdiction.8 In
contrast, Mrs. Davis argued that she was properly before the district
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27 (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1043(a) (McKinney 1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1975); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Page 1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (1966); OR. REv. STAT. § 419-498 (1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6337 (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-31 (1970);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.2 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-35 (1978); VA.
CODE § 16.1-266(c)(2) (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(6) (West Supp. 1978);
Smith v. Edminston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.
252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W. Va. 590, 203 S.E.
2d 140 (1974).
62. 442 F. Supp. at 261.
63. See Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d
374 (5th Cir. 1980). Mrs. Davis' attorney certified therein that he was retained by
Hilary Davis on April 19, 1976.
64. Id.
65. 618 F.2d at 387-89.
66. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 39, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 3-4.
68. See Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 49, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1980).
295 11 5:1981
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court, having satisfied the requirements of Younger v. Harris69 and
Moore v. Sims,7 0 since there were adjudicatory proceedings pending.
The jurisdiction question was dealt with by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in its rehearing of the case en banc. A bare majority ac-
knowledged the propriety of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in the
case.7 '
CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court's rule (based on the Ninth Circuit's
case-by-case approach) has now been declared unconstitutional by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judicial fireworks may yet be antici-
pated in view of the split which now exists between the Ninth Circuit,
which maintains the case-by-case approach, and the Fifth Circuit's ab-
solute rule.
As noted in the beginning of this comment, Florida law classifies a
great many different types of children as "dependent." This compli-
cates the question of whether the indigent parents of a child involved in
dependency proceedings should always, or only under certain circum-
stances, be granted the right to court-appointed counsel. For example,
a child may have been abandoned by the parents, or may find himself
presented to the court by his parents, who charge that he is "ungovern-
able" in that he persistently disobeys their reasonable and lawful de-
mands.72 In these situations, should the state pay for the parent's attor-
ney? Certainly there are dependency situations in which the child
needs legal counsel at least as much as the parent, such as the case of
alleged parental abuse. In dependency proceedings, there are always
three interests: the child, the parent, and the state. These interests may
align and realign in various permutations, particularly according to the
category of dependency involved. To achieve fairness of all parties, a
rule should be adopted with sufficient flexibility to adequately protect
each interest within the context of each dependency situation. How-
69." 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
70. 442 U.S. 415 (1979), extending the Younger doctrine to matters involving
child custody.
71. No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981).
72. FLA. STAT. §39.01(9)(e) (1979). Regardless of the category involved, an ad-
judication of dependency can result in loss of parental custody. See note 16 supra.
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ever, in the adoption of such a rule, the protection of the child's best
interests must not be sacrificed out of concern for the rights of his
parents.
Lucy Chernow Brown
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